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and con. Such a recognition would allow more persons to
tie up the estate of a testator with contests of his will, and
the resulting depletion of the estate with the costs incident
to the defense of these suits is a worthy argument against
the propriety of the acceptance of this absolute view. In
rebuttal, the statutory limitation on the time for filing a
caveat might be sufficient to prevent overburdening litigation; and moreover, protection of parties who may have a
right to property is a strong argument for the adoption of
the absolute view. In view of the history of the treatment
of this problem by the Court of Appeals, it is more probable
that this Court would decline the adoption of any absolute
view, but rather would prefer to have each different situation separately considered, at which time its inclusion or
exclusion from the class of qualified contestants would of
necessity be made.
ROBERT LEE KARWACKI

Punitive Damages In Equity
Superior Construction Co. v. Elmo'
Appellant, as a result of his building operations, caused
debris and silt to be deposited on appellee's land. In the
trial court, in equity, appellee secured an injunction against
further trespass and an award of full compensatory damages, as well as $1,000.00 as punitive damages. This decree
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except as to the allowance of punitive damages, on which question reargument
was ordered.
On reargument, the Court held that where a party seeking equitable relief also seeks punitive damages as incidental thereto, the court of equity, as a condition to its
giving assistance, will require the party to waive any claim
to punitive damages because they are in the nature of a
penalty or forfeiture. The Court further held that in awarding damages to provide complete relief and avoid multiplicity of suits, it was applying a permissive and not a mandatory jurisdiction, and that since the rule was one of convenience, it would be applied only in those cases where it
was consistent with the fundamental principles of equity,
one of which principles is that equity will permit only what
is just and right, with no element of vengeance.2
'204 Md. 1, 102 A. 2d 739, 104 A. 2d 581 (1954).
'The Court stated that punitive damages could have been justifiably
awarded in the present case if It had been tried at law. Ibid, 14.
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The appellees contended that since equity may award
compensatory damages as incidental relief, it is reasonable
and consistent with equitable principles to grant full relief
by going on, in a proper case, to award punitive damages
as well. They also argued that when such incidental jurisdiction is taken over a purely legal claim to avoid multiplicity of suits, the court sits pro tanto as a court of law,
and is not giving equitable relief but legal relief. Admitting
that the weight of authority is against their position, they
contended that the contrary cases are inconsistent with the
theory upon which equity courts award damages as incident
to purely equitable relief.
Against this the appellant argued that historically equity
has always refused to enforce penalties or forfeitures and
has sought not to penalize but only to provide restitution
where the normal legal remedies are inadequate; hence,
that to award punitive damages would run counter to basic
and long established equitable principles. It also contended
that plaintiff, by seeking relief in equity, had waived any
claim for such damages which could have been recovered
at law.
The case is one of first impression in the Maryland
courts, but authority for the court's decision certainly is
not wanting.' An early American authority cited by the
court is Bird v. The W. & M. R.R. Company.4 In this case
an injunction against continuing trespass and compensatory
damages was awarded, but the court said, "plaintiff by
applying to this Court, waives all claim for vindictive damages". This statement was not supported by authority or
reasoning, but in answering appellee's claim in the instant
case that this was a casual statement without support in
precedent, the Court of Appeals referred to the prior Supreme Court case of Livingston v. Woodworth5 and to the
English rule as set out in Colburn v. Simms." In the former
See cases cited on Reargument, ibid, 14, 16-17, fn. 1.
'8 Rich. Equity 46, 57, 64 Amer. Dec. 739, 746 (S. C. 1855).
15 How. 546, 559 (U. S. 1854). The court in this case held that equity,
because of its basic principles, would not award punitive damages, saying:
"But before a tribunal which refuses to listen even to any, save those
whose acts and motives are perfectly fair and liberal, they cannot be
permitted to contravene the highest and most benignant principle of
the being and constitution of that tribunal.
"There they will be allowed to claim that which, ex aequo et bono
is theirs, and nothing beyond this."
12 Hare 543, 553-4, 67 Eng. Rep. 224, 229 (1843). Vice Chancellor Sir
James Wigram said:
"... the question suggests itself whether a court of equity will afford
any assistance In giving effect to a forfeiture, or whether the parties
ought not, so far as respects this claim, to be left to their remedies at
law. The general rule undoubtedly is that, where a party seeking
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case punitive damages were denied on general equitable
principles; in the latter on the waiver theory.
The Court of Appeals reasoned in the instant case that
the waiver theory was especially applicable because appellees had asked for compensatory damages only and had included no prayer for general relief. Also, the further fact
that by Statute,' allowing injunctive relief at law with
accompanying damages, there was provided an adequate
alternative to relief in equity seemed to settle the Court's
conclusion that equity should not afford relief. Karns v.
Allen' is cited by the court as a case in which it was held
that waiver occurred by resort to a court of equity. This
result was reached even after the court acknowledged the
principle that once equity takes jurisdiction it is supposed
to give complete relief.
The courts in this country have generally held that
punitive damages may not be awarded in equity.' The
minority position is a decidedly weak one in point of numbers. In Texas, three cases gave punitive damages in
equity, 10 but the later case of Bush v. Goffrey" expressly
refused to follow them, saying that they gave no consideration to the fundamental principle involved. In Mississippi,
equitable relief is incidentally entitled to the benefit of a penalty or
forfeiture, the court requires him, as a condition of its assistance, to
waive the penalty or forfeiture."
Md. Code (1951) Art. 75, Secs. 135-147. This authorizes the plaintiff
under certain circumstances to obtain an injunction at law, together with
the simultaneous recovery of damages available in the ordinary action
at law.
8135 Wise. 48, 115 N. W. 357, 360 (1908)
"Of course the general rule that where a court of equity takes jurisdiction it will award full relief is well understood, 'but the question Is
whether a court of equity should in any case award exemplary damages,
or is it confined simply to giving compensatory damages? After considerable search we have been able to find no case where exemplary
damages were allowed by a court of equity, and while our investigation shows a great dearth of authority in point on the subject, the
cases which in any way touch the question appear to lean to the doctrine that a court of equity should award only compensatory damages."
Supra, n. 3.
10Oliver v. Chapman, 15 Tex. 400 (1855) ; Western Cottage Piano & Organ
Co. v. Anderson, 97 Tex. 432, 79 8. W. 516 (1904) ; Mossop v. Zapp, 189 S. W.
979 (Tex. 1916).
1 84 S.W. 2d 759, 764 (Tex. 1935):
"Now, full restitution has been made to the complainant, and she has
been made whole. It would ill comport with the principles of equity
for the court to visit upon the defendants a sort of punishment to the
pecuniary profit of the complainant and consequent loss of the defendants. A court of equity Is a court of conscience, but not a forum of
vengence. It will make restitution, but not reprisals. It will fill full
the measure of compensation, but will not overflow It with vindictive
damages."
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punitive damages were awarded in one case, 12 which could
however also be construed as the award of enlarged compensatory damages only, and in another case 8 the language
as to punitive damages was dictum. Two Tennessee cases 4
have allowed such recovery, but without citing authority.
In the California case of Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction
Oil Co.,'5 where the trespasser continued to drill oil after
the injunction had issued, it was held that the rule of damages was the same as that at law.'6 But it was also said
that there was but one form of action under the California
Code, the implication being that it did not matter on which
side the damages were sought. 7
Two Maryland cases relate to the problem only inferentially, s but directly in point is Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola
Laboratories,9 a Federal case from Maryland. Judge Soper,
speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, said that a court of equity did not have power to
award exemplary damages without express statutory authorization, and further, that one who applies to equity in
the absence of such statute waives such recovery, as the
function of equity is to compensate and not to punish.
There is certainly therefore adequate basis in precedent
for the Court's decision in the present case,2" and the Court's
12Hines v. Imperial Naval Stores Co., 101 Miss. 802, 58 So. 650 (1912).
"Neal v. Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 123 So. 861 (1929).
South Penn Oil Co. v. Stone, 57 S. W. 374 (Tenn. 1900) (decided in the
Tennessee Chancery Court of Appeals). Lichter v. Fulcher, 22 Tenn. App.
670, 125 S. W. 2d 501 (1938) (decided in an intermediate court).
20 Cal. App. 2d 170, 66 P. 2d 1215 (1937).
"The Court of Appeals in the instant case, supra, n. 1, 21, pointed out
that the punitive damages given in the California case for not obeying the
injunction were really enlarged compensatory damages similar to those
given in the coal cases in Maryland. See Mt. Savage G. Ck. Co. v. Monahan,
132 Md. 654, 104 A. 480 (1918) and cases cited.
1 But ef. the statement of Judge Soper in Coca-Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Lab.,
Inc., infra, n. 19, 64, that:
"In the absence of statute the function of a court of equity in the
award of damages is confined to compensation and does not include the
authority to award damages in the nature of a penalty; and hence one
who appeals to a court of equity for relief waives vindictive damages."
18Jacob Carmel, et al. v. Joseph Lipnick, et al., 3 Baltimore City Reports,
475 (1916), where it is taken for granted that equity could not award
punitive damages. Cross v. McClenahan, 54 Md. 21, 24 (1880), where the
court said equity never enforces a penalty.
"155 F. 2d 59, 64 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. den., 329 U. S. 773 (1946).
10The encyclopedias state the situation rather succinctly. Thus in 15 Am.
Jur. 704, Damages, Sec. 268, it is said: "As a general rule, courts of equity
will not award exemplary damages, although this rule is not without
exception." See also: 19 Am. Jur. 125, Equity, Sec. 125.
The reference to Corpus Juris Secundum was cited by both parties in
their briefs. 30 C. J. S. 426, Equity, Sec. 72, states: "Damages recoverable
in equity as incidental relief are ordinarily limited to compensatory damages, and . . . equity as a rule will not award exemplary or punitive
damages." See also 25 C. J. S. 709, Damages, Sec. 117.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

supporting its waiver approach with emphasis on the existence of a complete remedy at law permitted by statute 21 is
understandable. However, it may be suggested that the reason why equity should not award such damages has never
been thoroughly and logically set forth in any of the authorities. Conceding that punitive damages are the sort of
penalty which equity should not normally encourage as a
part of equitable relief, yet, is it not also true that applying
this general doctrine to a case such as the present one is in
contravention of another principle of equity, that once it
takes jurisdiction, it gives full relief to prevent a multiplicity of suits? It seems clear that full justice is not done,
as the plaintiff cannot recover all of the damages to which
he would have been entitled at law. Such a situation presents the anomaly that a court of law might give more
complete relief than a court of equity in view of the statutory authorization for the issuance of an injunction in suits
at law.
It is submitted that there are actually no substantial
reasons of policy or administration which would prohibit
the award of exemplary damages in equity as incidental to
equitable relief to which the plaintiff shows himself entitled. The policy of taking jurisdiction in equity in order
to do complete justice would indicate rather that such damages should be permitted. When equity awards damages
as incidental relief in a case such as this, it is awarding
legal and not equitable damages, and even though this is
a discretionary power, it would seem that it should, when
it is exercised, be governed by legal and not equitable
principles. This would not be a case of equity's creating
or favoring punitive damages, but, merely one of equity's
permitting them to complete equity's relief when they are
already otherwise established by law.
The two bases which the Court adopted as its rationale
are perhaps open to some question. The waiver theory
manifestly is dependent upon the principle on which it
rests, namely, that equity will not enforce a penalty. If this
falls, the waiver theory must surely fall with it.
21 Under
Md. Code (1951) Art. 75, Secs. 135-147, an injunction may be
awarded at law which is in addition to any ordinary legal relief to which
plaintiff may be entitled. It should be noted however, that Sec. 147 states
that these provisions are not to interfere with ordinary equity jurisdiction
in matters of injunction. It is likely that an injunction against trespass
would be more easily obtained through the customary equity procedure
than at law. To the extent that this is so, it would give greater force to
the argument that equity should, If necessary to give full relief, award
exemplary damages where these could be recovered at law.
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While at an earlier time there may have been good
reason for the dichotomy of legal maxims inherent in the
majority view,22 there seems no compelling reason in principle why equity should not now afford a complete remedy
for every wrong of which it takes cognizance. Certainly
convenience would be aided by such an approach. Even
more important is the fact that justice would be better
served if equity afforded complete relief rather than forever partially denying to the complainant the full relief to
which he would have been entitled at law. Justice sometimes necessarily involves a penalty. It seems logical and
proper that the principle against penalties should yield to
the principle of doing complete justice in equity, where
equity jurisdiction exists and when a penalty is called for
and permitted by law.
GERALD

J. ROBINSON

Estoppel By Deed Application Against
A Tenant By The Entirety
Columbian Carbon Company v. Kight'
Appellant, the Columbian Carbon Company, a Delaware
Corporation, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court
of Garrett County against the appellees, Edward G. Kight
and wife, Evelyn Kight Warsaw, divorced wife of Pierce
H. Warsaw, and Ray Kight, to obtain a decree declaring
that an oil and gas lease of a tract of land, which was
executed by a husband alone during coverture and which
pertained to land held with the wife by the entireties, be
valid and enforceable as to husband's interest after divorce.
The bill alleged in substance that Pierce H. Warsaw and
his wife, Evelyn Kight Warsaw, acquired the land in question in 1946 as tenants by the entireties. On February 24,
1953, Warsaw alone executed a lease to the appellant wherein he warranted generally his title to the land, expressly
agreeing to defend the title, and covenanted that appellant
should have quiet possession of the land. The lease was
duly recorded on March 6, 1953. On June 22, 1953, the Warsaws were divorced. In December of 1953, Warsaw and his
divorced wife conveyed the land to Edward G. Kight; and
2 Mid Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Bettis, 180 Okla. 193, 69 P. 2d 346,
348 (1937). ". . . the basis of the rule seems to be that, historically, the
assessing of damages is not a function of a court of equity, and it will assess
actual damages only as ancillary to equitable relief."

1207 Md. 203, 114 A. 2d 28 (1955).

